DO HOUSEHOLDS FULLY SHARE RISK? EVIDENCE FROM GHANA

Intrahousehold analyses provide new insights into how households make economic decisions. Much of the work in economics has traditionally treated the household as a single economic actor, but a number of studies are providing evidence that the dynamics among household members affect the outcomes of household economic decisions. This paper contributes to our understanding of such models by incorporating the variability of individual incomes into the analysis of intrahousehold resource allocations, using detailed household survey data from Ghana.Consumer/Household Economics, Risk and Uncertainty,

MODELS OF INTRAHOUSEHOLD RESOURCE ALLOCATION: ASSUMPTIONS AND EMPIRICAL TESTS

This paper reviews and analyzes a literature that examines the restrictiveness of focusing on households as single units of analysis. In particular, this literature asks: To what extent can we use the household as a unit of analysis, and when do we need to disaggregate the household and look at individual behavior within the household? In this paper, I examine the different models of intrahousehold resource allocation and the empirical work they have generated. Each of the models has a different set of assumptions about the four components of household decisions. The assumptions and predictions of each of the main models of intrahousehold resource allocation are presented; then I discuss the empirical work that tests the validity of the assumptions and discuss when the different models may be appropriate.Consumer/Household Economics,

WOMEN'S BARGAINING POWER IN HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC DECISIONS: EVIDENCE FROM GHANA

In this paper, the percentage of assets held by women within the household is used as a measure of women's bargaining power. The assets used in this paper include land, savings, and business assets. Using detailed household survey data from Ghana, I demonstrate that the share of assets owned by women has a significant impact on household expenditure decisions. This provides additional support for the notion that women's bargaining power can be measured, at least in some dimensions, and that women's bargaining power is an important determinant of household economic decisions. It suggests that other measures of women's bargaining power may also be useful for understanding household decisions.Consumer/Household Economics,

UNDERSTANDING FARM-LEVEL TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM CIMMYT'S MICRO SURVEYS IN EASTERN AFRICA

Drawing on a series of technology adoption studies carried out by the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) in collaboration with national agricultural research systems in Eastern Africa during 1996-98, this paper suggests alternative approaches for designing technology adoption studies to obtain as much useful information as possible. It describes the Eastern African studies and summarizes specific lessons learned, asks what can be learned from farm-level studies in a few communities, explores generic limitations of micro studies and a range of problems and issues faced in carrying out such studies, addresses challenges that arise in trying to put together a set of compatible micro studies, and lists overall conclusions and specific recommendations.Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF RESEARCH ON WOMEN FARMERS IN AFRICA: LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS; WITH AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Based on an extensive review of the literature on women farmers in Africa, this paper explores the potential reasons why women farmers have not adopted improved maize technologies and discusses the implications for agricultural research. Women farmers are often constrained by their lack of access to labor, land, and inputs. In addition, women may prefer different outputs than men. Finally, the dynamics of household decision-making affects technology adoption; roles and responsibilities within the household are often renegotiated when new technologies are adopted, and women may be reluctant to provide labor if they do not receive some of the benefits. Each section of this paper includes a number of questions that may provide insights into the gender roles and dynamics in a particular community. Three general conclusions can be drawn from the available literature. First, there is enormous complexity and heterogeneity among African households. Second, there is no simple way to summarize gender roles within African households and communities. Third, gender roles and responsibilities are dynamic; in particular, they change with new economic circumstances. An extensive annotated bibliography on gender issues and the adoption of maize technologies in Africa follows the review of studies.Farm Management, Labor and Human Capital,

ARE HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION DECISIONS COOPERATIVE? EVIDENCE ON MIGRATION AND MILK SALES FROM NORTHERN KENYA

Replaced with revised version of paper 08/29/02.Consumer/Household Economics,

Are Household Production Decisions Cooperative? Evidence on Pastoral Migration and Milk Sales from Northern Kenya

Market-based development efforts frequently create opportunities to generate income from goods previously produced and consumed within the household. Production within the household is often characterized by a gender and age division of labor. Market development efforts to improve well being may lead to unanticipated outcomes if household production decisions are non-cooperative. We develop and test models of household decision-making to investigate intra-household decision making in a nomadic pastoral setting from Kenya. Our results suggest that household decisions are contested, with husbands using migration decisions to resist wives' ability to market milk.Intrahousehold decision-making, household production, Kenya

Milk Money and Intra-Household Bargaining: Evidence on Pastoral Migration and Milk Sales from Northern Kenya

In this study, we investigate the impact of new market opportunities on Gabra nomadic pastoralists living in an arid climate in northern Kenya. The Gabra have recently experienced growth of milk marketing opportunities, and this change has caused a renegotiation of intrahousehold arrangements that affect households' location and migration decisions. We model three different outcomes of the household bargaining processes and test them empirically. Our results are consistent with a contested model of the household in which husbands locate households farther from towns in order to limit milk marketing opportunities.Livestock Production/Industries,

Gender and the Distribution of Wealth in Developing Countries

women, assets, gender inequality, marital regimes, inheritance, land, Latin America, Africa, law